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ABSTRACT: According to several international surveys Spain is among the
western countries with the most negative views of Jews. While quantitative
data on the topic accumulates, there is a significant lack of interpretative
approaches that might explain the particular Spanish case. This paper
15 presents the background, methodology and major results of a discussion
group-based study on antisemitism, which was conducted in Spain in the
autumn of 2009. The study identifies and locates in different socio-economic
and ideological milieus the range of stereotypical discourses on Jews,
Judaism and the Arab Israeli conflict in Spain. Analysis of the group
20 meetings shows that, despite growing secularization in Spanish society, the
central explanatory variable for persisting and resurging antisemitism in this
country is still religion in a broad cultural sense.AQ1AQ2;
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1. Introduction
A number of recently performed public opinion surveys have revealed that
Spain has one of the highest levels of antisemitism in Europe. The studies
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undertaken by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) concerning attitudes
30 towards Jews, Israel and the Palestinian Israeli conflict in 10 European
countries, asked people to grade their agreement with a number of anti-
Jewish statements. The Spanish replies stood out among all other
countries for nearly all the categories.2 A 2008 survey by the Pew
Research Center found 46 percent of the Spanish rating Jews unfavorably.
35 While unfavorable views of Jews  and Muslims  are on the rise in all
European countries surveyed, Spain surpasses them all by a wide margin.
The framework of the statements, the standardized testing procedures
and the near ubiquitous use of telephone interviewing adopted in these
studies raise a large number of questions concerning the aptness of the
40 instrument employed for measuring such a complex phenomenon as
antisemitism.3 However, the results obtained from these surveys have the
undeniable virtue of having raised the profile of the discussion about anti-
Jewish sentiment in today’s Spain, where the vast majority of researchers,
politicians, social figures and government institutions believe that anti-
45 Jewish sentiment does not in fact exist. The present empirical research
was undertaken in this context at the behest of Casa Sefarad Israel, a
public institution that is dependent on the Spanish Government, which
decided to finance its own sociological study. This provided an
opportunity to deepen the scope of the analysis and to determine whether
50 there is a Spanish exceptionalism concerning antisemitism.
This paper presents the background, methods and major results of a
discussion group-based qualitative study on antisemitism, which was
conducted in Spain in 2009.
2. Overview and research questions
55 The theoretical framework and research questions of this study draw on a
number of scholarly works on antisemitism in Spain, which use mostly
historical approaches, as well as some recent studies on the depiction of
Israel and the IsraeliArab conflict in the Spanish media.
2. For example, in the last survey undertaken in 2009, 74 percent of those interviewed
answered ‘fairly certain’ to the statement: ‘Jews enjoy too much power in international
financial markets’ See: Anti-Defamation League, Attitudes Toward Jews in Seven
European Countries, February 2009.http://www.adl.org/Public%20ADL%20Anti-
semitism%20Presentation%20February%202009%20_3_.pdf
3. Only questionnaires carried out in a standardized way will produce comparable data
across different countries. But the question arises whether one should suppose that
the categories used in survey studies are adequate for the comparative study of
antisemitic opinions and attitudes. In addition to being elusive, they are marked by
their own homegrown character.
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Studies on antisemitism by historians underscore the persistence of
60 attitudes connected to casticismo [Spanish traditionalism] and the enduring
link between the ‘Jewish question’ and Spanish national identity (Alvarez
Chillida 2002; Alvarez Chillida and Izquierdo 2007; Rohr 2007).4 In this
sense, antisemitic motives of a religious nature (Jews as Christ-killers,
accusations of ritual crimes and profanation of Christian symbols, etc.) did
65 not disappear following the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in the
fifteenth century but rather remained firmly anchored in the cultural
memory. Modern anti-Jewish propaganda added a discourse of its own to
the older one. It underwent a re-birth during the Second Republic (1931
1936) particularly with the attribution of an international Jewish
70 conspiracy and the myth of Reconquista.5 Modern antisemitism contained
elements of nationalist identity politics, unified around notions of religion
and national purity, in the face of a Socialist or Liberal internationalism
coded as ‘Jewish’ or even directly identified with Jews (Krauze 2005; Rohr
2007). Our study tries to find out whether negative perceptions of Jews
75 were inherited from older religiously rooted stereotypes, since the country
is still by tradition and culture predominantly catholic,6 and whether this
type of thinking, hitherto useful to reduce complexities and constitute an
‘us’ in terms of national characteristics, religious identity or social
formations, continues to play a role in contemporary Spain.
80 Philologists and social anthropologists have pointed out the long and
persistent roots of tales and traditions with anti-Jewish elements in Spain.
Centuries of casticismo left a deep anti-Jewish mark on Spanish popular
culture, closely linked to anti-Moorish sentiment (Pedrosa 2007). Today in
Spanish languages, Castilian, Catalan and Galician, calling someone a judı´o
85 can refer to anyone who is accused of usurious practices (Alvarez Chillida
2002). ‘Ir a matar a judı´os’ or ‘going to kill Jews’ is still used, and means
4. Casticismo is a literary, cultural and ideological style linked to reactionary thinking. It
is an assertion of traditionalism, expressed in terms of culture, religion, life style,
attitudes, speech or political and social organization. It is perceived by traditionalists
as behavior proper to their breeding (casta), seen not as a question of race or ethnicity
but as a reflection of national Spanish character (see Stallaert 1998).
5. According to Isabel Rohr, this political myth was developed in the nineteenth century
‘as Spanish intellectuals, traumatized by the loss of Spain’s American colonies,
pondered their national identity and history’. The idea was that ‘there existed an
eternal Catholic-Spanish essence, Hispanidad, born in the Visigoth time and
resurrected during the centuries-long fight to capture Spain back from the Moors,
the Reconquista’ (Rohr 2007: 4).
6. The path to secularization in Spain is reflected dramatically in individual religious
practices, although not as much in religious identification. According to the survey
barometer of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociolo´gicas (CIS), December 2006, 77.1
percent of Spaniards still define themselves as Catholics.
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going off to drink wine and engage in noisy behavior on Holy Thursday
before Easter. Many utterances related to Jews still contain negative
connotations in the Spanish language. A source of sociological information
90 is provided by dictionaries, which continue to list many of these
antisemitic terms, or terms which contain antisemitic explanations. For
example, a judiada is defined as a ‘bad action which was tendentiously
considered as Jewish behaviour’ (Dictionary of the Real Academia
Espan˜ola  DRAE, 2005). Sinagoga, according to the same source is ‘to
95 gather together for an illegal undertaking’, while hebreo is defined as a
merchant and one of the accepted meanings of judı´o is a ‘greedy person’
(Maria Moliner). It is also true that an antisemite is defined as a person
who is an ‘enemy of the Hebrew race, of their culture or their influence’
(DRAE, 2005 our emphasis). Our study attempted to find out the extent
100 to which the use of aphorisms and antisemitic language in dictionaries
reflects perceptions about Jews in today’s Spain, and whether they are a
factor exciting antisemitic opinion or just semantic leftovers from a nearly
extinct religious culture due to disappear with the passing of older
generations.
105 A series of studies undertaken over the last decade have looked at
representations of Israel and the Middle East conflict more generally in
the Spanish media. Israel and the conflicts in which it is embroiled are the
main elements associated with ‘Jewishness’ in Spain today. Some of these
studies are based on content and discourse analysis (Wahno´n 2005; Baer
110 and Lo´pez 2010), and others offer valuable reflections by Spanish
journalists (Albiac 2004; Villatoro 2004; Culla 2005; Gabriel 2010). These
studies have maintained that there is a specifically Spanish pattern, based
on a combination of characteristics each of which taken on its own may not
be exclusive to the Spanish media. This includes: (i) a tendency to pro-
115 Arab Manichean thinking when discussing the parties to the conflict, (ii)
the overlap of anti-Zionist and anti-American rhetoric7 especially
prevalent in the liberal press but not absent in the conservative media,
and (iii) the use of stereotypes rooted in religious antisemitism in the
portrayal of Israelis and the State of Israel especially in opinion columns
120 and editorial cartoons. What does constitute a specifically Spanish
characteristic is the adoption of these discourses across a broad swathe
of the political spectrum. Our study attempted to establish the extent to
which there is a link between published opinion and public opinion and
the level of influence on the general population of stereotyped and
125 occasionally unabashed antisemitic messages derived from the Middle
East conflict.
7. According to the Transatlantic Trends study of 2004, in Spain hostile sentiments
towards the United States are the most pronounced in Europe.
4
{REUS}articles/REUS676451/REUS_A_676451_O.3d[x] Tuesday, 17th April
EUROPEAN SOCIETIES
3. Data collection: the discussion group
Spain presents a case of antisemitism without Jews (Jews in Spain
represent less than 0.1 percent of the population). Basically, anti-Jewish
130 perceptions cannot be related to objective considerations, such as friction
between actual social groups, but rather to imaginary or abstract Jews. To
investigate the makeup of this abstract and imagined Jew in contemporary
Spain and to uncover the roots of this construction, the discussion group
seemed to provide the most suitable type of research method.8
135 We understand the discussion group as device for producing discourses
that simulate a conversation, where the visions and values of the
participants refer to a system of common signifiers. What it is said during
‘group discourse’ is more than a simple series of statements. What is
enunciated is a socially coherent discursive praxis. The participants carry
140 with them the indelible imprint of the social environment to which they
belong. The information obtained from the group participating in the
discussion is a reconstruction of the structures of meaning re-created by
the social interaction. The conversation of the group has a logic which
reproduces the social bond and the collective element (Leo´n Barrios 2007).
145 Technically speaking, this research method consists of bringing
together individuals for a ‘group discussion’ in a meeting whose duration
is between 1.5 and 2 hours, and is led by a moderator who outlines the
topics to be discussed. Talk is free and the proposed topic is discussed
around a table in the most neutral setting possible. The size of the group
150 varies from seven to nine people. These are not real groups but rather
groups with an identical structure. Participants are of a similar age, share
the same life strata, and have a similar socialization with regard to
education, professional track, area of residence, etc. The individual shares
and displays a native or vernacular language in the group dynamic and a
8. The discussion group is a qualitative research technique anchored in two theoretical
approaches with substantial epistemological differences. The North American version,
best known today as the focus group, was developed through the use of group
interview techniques as an instrument of social and psychotherapy-based analysis. It
was undertaken in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s by Robert K. Merton, M.
Fiske and Patricia L. Kendall. The other version is European, in particular Spanish,
the work of Jesu´s Iba´n˜ez (1979). Known as the ‘discussion group’, its theoretical
framework combines linguistics, semiotics, and structuralism. As a research method it
has been developed by Enrique Martin Criado (1997), who added an interactionist
dimension to the analysis. It is nowadays widely employed for the empirical analysis of
daily social life (see Valles and Baer 2005). Research on antisemitism with this type of
methodology can be traced back to the ‘Group experiments’ conducted by Friedrich
Pollock at the Frankfurter Institut fu¨r Sozialforschung in 1950/51 (Pollock and Adorno
2011).
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155 ‘group discourse mode’ develops in relation to the topics established by
the moderator.
In accordance with the purpose of the study, our intention was to
broach a discussion about Jews, Judaism and Israel, in order to explore the
specific workings of antisemitism in different social environments. The
160 purpose is not to learn about individual opinions and the research is not
about reproducing personal discourses, such as is common in the
interview mode. The methodology is group-centered and focuses on the
collective patterns of meaning and interpretation that emerge through
the interaction. Far from being a psychology of the antisemite, our study
165 falls into the category of sociology of (antisemitic) communication and
knowledge. It looks into antisemitic talk and considers the possibility of
antisemitic opinion as a cultural code linked to a broader field of political,
religious or social positioning (Volkov 2000). The analysis of group
discourse should then bring us closer to understanding the use of certain
170 antisemitic semantics in various environments and social milieus, while
also showing their respective intensity and relevance.
4. Sampling and group composition
The group meetings were designed according to the assumption that there
can be significant differences between various expressions of the
175 antisemitic phenomenon in Spain. We selected groups that differ
according to their social strata, political identification or religious practice.
Age has been deployed as a variable to integrate a diachronic perspective
into the study. The types making up the canon in the history of
antisemitism  religious, modern/racial, and political or ‘new’ antisemit-
180 ism  served as background hypotheses in the composition of the groups.
The groups were, therefore, defined according to a cultural/religious axis
(classical anti-Judaism), a social class axis (modern antisemitism) and a
political axis composed of left/right wing political positions (anti-Zionism
and new antisemitism).9
185 Needless to say, our sampling method is of a theoretical, not statistical,
nature. While clearly not covering the entire scope of milieus and
lifeworlds, we aimed to have a structural sample of the Spanish, non-
migrant population. We consciously excluded a cohort from our sample
9. To the extent that modern antisemitism is expressed in fundamentally anti-liberal and
anti-modern terms, social class is obviously only one variable among others, closely
correlated to political and religious aspects, and would require more detailed
explanation (see Goldberg 2008).
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positioned on the extreme right since discourses in this environment are
190 more clear-cut and generally known (Cobo and Ortega 2008) (see Figure 1).
The RG1 group comprises participants from the 65 age group from
rural populations, which reflects the attempt to learn about the persistence
of traditional religious antisemitism. The selection of RG2, business
executives, is designed to test the hypothesis of modern/economic
195 antisemitic discourse. They belong to the sphere of commerce and
finance, spheres often defined as ‘Jewish’ with attributes of abstraction,
mobility, intangibility and rootlessness. This group only includes men
because women are a minority among Spain’s business executives. RG3
corresponds to urban areas witnessing strong economic growth in eastern
200 Spain active in terms of religious (catholic) and political (conservative)
identity. They are all voters of the Partido Popular and active members of
the Catholic Church. RG4 is a group at the center with respect to politics
(non-voters or those voting center options such as Convergencia i Unio,
PSUC), young, educated (all university students) and living in Barcelona,
205 where there is a much weaker national identification with the Spanish
State. RG5 is a group whose (leftist) political identity is strong. These are
activist and strongly ideological youth who belong to social movements
and associations, living in the working class periphery of Madrid and
highly self-defined in regard to class and activist orientation. RG6 is a
Figure 1. XXX
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210 progressive group, voting for the Partido Socialista, middle-aged and
already professionally established in areas such as education, journalism,
and state agencies. It is a group that belongs to the liberal mainstream.10
The individuals for each group meeting were contacted through a third
party, ‘contactadores’ who selected people who did not know each other
215 and matched the group profile criteria established by the research team.
A series of exhaustive in-depth exploratory interviews were carried out
in advance with individuals who correspond to the various group profiles.
The purpose of this was to sort out the various discourses, to refine the
discussion guidelines and to make the moderator familiar with the topic of
220 research.
5. The group dynamics
The discussion group attempts to provide a space for communication
which progresses in the manner of a normal conversation. The selection of
the initial topic introduced by the moderator is an important factor
225 designed to be open and tangible enough to provoke the fluid and
spontaneous exchange. This was not easy to achieve. Jesu´s Iba´n˜ez,
paraphrasing Heisenberg’s famous quote, wrote that ‘all the various
approaches are good, but they involve certain consequences  they
produce certain effects  while others lead to yet other effects; the
230 researcher must quite simply place himself in a position to calculate the
effects resulting from his decisions’ (1979: 262).11 We decided that
the moderator would provide the group with an initial starter topic
indirectly tied to the actual research topic:
. . .We are conducting a study on religious minorities in Spain: Muslims, Islam,
235 Jews, Judaism, Protestants, Protestantism and we would like to know your
opinion, what your current thinking is on this subject, on these religions and
the people of those faiths. . .
This initial starter topic concerning ‘religious minorities’ reflected a
methodological choice: not to go straight into the specific topic of research
240 whose strong potential for reactivity was foreseeable. It also contained a
10. Two groups which were part of our initial conception were not included due to
budgetary limits. RG7 included the unemployed and sub-employed living in the
urban periphery. RG8 was conceived in order to explore the possible survival of a
coexistence heritage  the myth of ‘Sefarad’ and of the three cultures  in a location
(notably Andalusia) where this conception is widespread.
11. ‘What we observe is not nature itself but nature exposed to our method of
questioning’ (Northrop 1962: 17).
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theoretical implication since we were interested in exploring the image of
the Jew and how it appears in relation to various portrayals of the ‘other’
in a cultural system which still revolves around the identity-difference
dichotomy. The homogeneity of the Spanish population in the perception
245 of an ‘us’ (Catholic) made it possible to entertain this oblique focus on
minorities of so-called notorio arraigo (well known and rooted origin):
Muslims, Protestants and Jews, who precisely due to their roots (and
uprooting) have come to compose the ‘other’ in Spain. They are seen as
culturally and religiously different, antithetical and hostile in their social
250 and political make-up.12
At first, the work of the moderator remained purposefully non-
directive, in order to allow for spontaneity and frankness and to ensure
that the group would persist. But in the second phase the moderator used
a more direct form of questioning and a more detailed exploration of the
255 thematic: Judaism as a religion, Judaism in Spain and in the world, and
the conflict in the Middle East. In this phase, editorial cartoons from the
Spanish press concerning the conflict between Israel and Palestine were
also used as a means of projection (see for example Figure 3). This
combination, as we shall see, made it possible to reconstruct the
260 constitutive logic underlying the production of a discourse on the subject
of the Jew, Judaism and Israel and to observe in which dimensions and
areas antisemitism was evident. The group dynamics were maintained for
periods of between 1.45 and 2 hours.
6. The logic underlying the production of an antisemitic discourse
265 The first result which we wish to discuss is directly taken from the initial
starter topic which referred to three religious minorities, Muslim, Jewish
and Protestant. Although Jews were named as such in this introduction,
they hardly took up the whole discussion space during the open
moderation phase. At first, Muslims generally constituted the focus of
270 conversation. The group dynamic revolved around the problem of
immigration (although there were also references to Christian migrant
groups in Spain such as Romanians and South Americans), integration
and cultural differences. It was only during the directed phase of
moderation, when the moderator explicitly asked about the subject of
275 this study, that Jews, Judaism and Israel became subjects of discourses
charged with emotive weight and political intensity.
12. As indicated by Jose Manuel Pedrosa, ‘the Spanish tradition of anti-Judaism is
closely related to similar traditions which have been wielded against other people’
(2007: 32).
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The growing secularization of Spanish society in terms of individual
religious praxis, StateChurch relations and especially the erosion of
cultural/religious homogeneity through recent settlement of a non-
280 catholic migrant population (Agote and Santiago 2005) is one of the
milestones marking the perception and construction of images and
discourses on minorities (Muslims and Jews). On the one hand, there is
an ambivalent identification with Muslims, who seem to reflect an element
of the Spanish past. This was expressed in the group dynamics in terms of
285 ‘we used to be like that too’, meaning religious, male-chauvinist, backward
and poor. It involves a paternalist vision not devoid of racist elements (the
Muslim as the ‘good savage’ unpolluted by modernity), which exists both
among conservative and more progressive groups. On the other hand,
when the moderator brought it up, there was a clear counter-identification
290 in opposition to Judaism and the Jews. In relation to the Jews, no
identification was expressed; instead there was a feeling of unease from
entering uncharted territory (see Figure 2).
‘ The Muslims. . . they are in the middle-ages. . . they are there (points with his
finger to one end of the table), we are here. . . (points to the middle of the table)
295 Please place the Jews over there. . . they get way ahead’ (points his finger beyond
the table). (RG3)
Figure 2. XXX
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It looks like there were negative stereotypes for Muslims and positive
stereotypes for Jews in these statements. But in this particular context
these perceptions can be interpreted as a worldview that takes a hostile, or
300 at least very ambivalent, outlook on the values of modernization: the
mercantile world, commerce and industry.13 Anti-Americanism and
antisemitism, not strictly on religious grounds, are in fact here two
branches of the same tree: the rejection of modern western liberal values,
which in Hispanic cultures has been particularly pronounced. In
305 opposition to these values are the mysticism, heroism, and so-called
chivalrous values of the old regime. The figure of the Jew in general and
the State of Israel in particular are perceived and presented as the
incarnation of the values of the modern mercantile world. This is the
common thread which ties together the confrontation of both left and
310 right with the model of liberal democracy. Against the ‘imaginary Jews’ is
pitted an ‘imaginary Arab’, a noble savage uncontaminated by the spirit of
modern economics (Villatoro 2004).
It must be pointed out that in the context of the problem of integration
and assimilation of migrant minorities (a vector of communication of
315 tremendous importance in all the meetings of the groups), invisibility is
considered a virtue (they are not a bother, it is as if they were absent). ‘If
you don’t see them’ it follows that they have managed to adapt and
integrate. The Protestant minority are mentioned as an example in
contraposition to the Muslims whose public visibility (hijab, minarets,
320 etc.) tends to be seen as an attack on the ideal status of assimilationist
integration. The need for homogeneity and normalization places a
dominant emphasis on an assigned model of ideal integration in Spain,
associated with invisibility and the impossibility of recognizing cultural/
religious differences. This is one of the significant observations made in
325 this study which, though surpassing the objectives of the study, have
specific implications for the problem of antisemitism. The Jewish minority
in Spain (few in number, indistinguishable and therefore ‘invisible’) would
seem to match perfectly the requirement and demand imposed by the
collective imagination of the Spanish with regard to integration and respect.
330 But in the case of the Jews, non-visibility or absence of differentiation
carries an ambivalence which turns out to be very significant. Compliance
with this condition of invisibility, as a prior acceptance of Jews, is
accompanied by the production of fantasies and suspicions regarding their
social invisibility. The problem in relation to Jews is that they cannot be
13. The crisis of the ancien re´gime began and ended much later in Spain than in France.
The reasons for this delay lie in Spain?s belated capitalist development and the
peripheral character of its industrial and financial development. There was also no
nationally powerful bourgeoisie (see Perez Agote 2010: 227).
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335 identified and the inability to identify them becomes part of the
stereotype:
‘Behind the scenes, from behind they pull all the strings. . .’ (RG4). ‘Well you see, we
never really know. . . There are Jews everywhere’ (RG6). ‘They plot. . . and you
don’t even know it’. (RG3).
340 In the group dynamics the invisibility of the Jews in Spain ties in with
well-established, antisemitic motifs  the attribution of secrecy, hiding
under different flags, concealing actions in order to advance special
interests, etc.  which are mostly employed in the conspiratorial reading
of global events from financial crises to wars.
345 The American banks are Jewish, man, you know I mean just look at what the Jews
set up. . .’ (RG2). ‘They’ve managed to dominate political power in the United
States. Rockefeller did what he did’. ‘They’ve got the world by the rope. . .’ (RG3).
‘The Twin Towers thing. . . Fifty thousand people can fit in both towers, and the
Jews who were working there had time to escape’ (RG6).
350 In some ways the absence of empirical experience of actual Jews, Spanish
Jews, leads to a discussion of Jews conducted by way of images, most of
which are unequivocally antisemitic. These images are firmly established
in the collective imagination or in the cultural memory (Assmann 1994).14
These discourses are reproduced in different groups and contrary to
355 expectations there is little to distinguish the left from the right. What we
have identified is a gradual decline of religion-based antisemitic motifs
(among older people in small or medium scale rural settings, among the
lower middle class). ‘The Jews are bad . . .’ (RG1); and at the same time
the repetition and rationalization of an economics- or politics-based
360 antisemitic discourse (among youth and adults, urban, middle to lower
middle class, conservative and progressive). ‘Behind this [grabbing a can of
coke] are the Jews’ (RG6).
It is notable that the interpretative framework for perceiving Jews and
Muslims can also be applied to the Palestine Israel conflict whose
365 centrality, based on its hyper-visibility and special place in the Spanish
media, is present in the discourses of all groups with remarkable intensity.
Palestine is the object of the paternalistic outlook toward Muslims and the
conflict is perceived from a Manichean perspective and a cosmology
14. In some isolated cases, where the participant had actual experience of Jews, there is
an immediate questioning of the use of these negative stereotypes. This occurred in
RG2 (corporate) and in RG5 (students from Barcelona). In both cases an important
element of reflectivity was introduced into the group dynamic.
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impregnated with Catholic culture. We can identify here again the
370 ambivalence with respect to Spanish modernization we mentioned above:
the Arab as the ‘good savage’ who represents our past. This framework
assigns all available roles in advance. Palestine, as an antagonist to Israel,
can only be an innocent victim and Israel can only be guilty.
We need to support the weak side. It’s not a left-wing thing. It’s just human (RG1).
375 In the editorial cartoons about the conflict (see Figure 3) used by the
moderator in the group dynamic, numerous condensed versions of this
discourse were expressed across all groups.
There was no discussion in the groups with regards to representations
of the Star of David made of concentration camp wire, or the flag of the
380 United States where the stars are now Stars of David. When we used
cartoons as a projective technique, most group participants saw their ideas
about the conflict reflected in them and did not identify any antisemitic
trait.
The Holocaust was also the subject of discussions in group dynamics
385 and always emerged spontaneously. In historical terms the Jewish
specificity of the genocide is usually questioned by the participants
(what about the other victims?) and Holocaust remembrance is usually
perceived as specifically ‘Jewish’ and distant. The transnationalisation of
Holocaust culture with universal moral and political appeal, the effects
390 of which are also felt in Spain (Baer 2011; Baer and Schnettler 2011),
does not actually heighten sensitivity towards the issue of antisemitism;
it undermines it. The theme of the (former) victims as (present)
Figure 3. XXX
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perpetrators in Israeli uniform, which popped up frequently in the
groups, denies the possibility of any sustained memory of the Holocaust. It
395 is in turn recycled in a number of negative stereotypes: hypersensitivity
and manipulation through victimization, political (Zionist) instrumenta-
lization and mercantile gain (compensations).
‘These people are here doing all this stuff and then they go to the Holocaust Museum
and there is all this moaning, and then they go and continue their target practice. . .’
400 (RG5).
W: ‘What I understand is that they continue getting money from Germany. That’s
why it’s become such a huge thing. But in the case of the Poles, the others, and the
others. Those guys are real quiet’.
405 M: ‘What they don’t understand is that what was done to them, that’s what they’re
doing to the Palestinians. I’m not saying the Palestinians are saints, because they’re
not. Because from time to time they shoot a rocket, like those fireworks at a fair,
which don’t kill anyone and don’t do anything’. (. . .)
W: ‘On top of it you’re supposed to say: ‘Oh my, so many Jews have died’. And the
410 Palestinians. . .’ (RG1).
7. Some conclusions from the study
The analysis of the discussion groups provided some evidence concerning
the initial hypothesis. While the semantics of each group is characterized
by its own particular intensity, relevance and delivery, there remains the
415 notable fact of a cross-cutting and overlapping commonality between them
with regard to content and patterns of interpretation.
First we need to stress the particular difficulty posed by the Spanish
case for the framework of so-called ‘new antisemitism’ or ‘secondary
antisemitism’ theories, which since 2000 and in the context of the Arab
420 Israeli conflict have attempted to interpret the resurgence of antisemitism
in Europe. Unlike in France, antisemitism in Spain cannot be explained by
the growth of Muslim antisemitism (a minority phenomenon in Spain
because of the weak political voice of first generation immigration) nor can
demonization of Israel be understood as an effect of a particular
425 interpretation of the memory of the Holocaust (Finkielkraut 2004). There
is no such ‘deterritorialisation of the Intifada’ (Beck 2004) in Spain, nor
has Israel served the Spanish as a vessel into which to project all that is
bad in European history, i.e., the Jewish state as embodying an extreme,
aggressive, racially exclusive nationalism (Ottolenghi 2005). The marginal
430 position of Spain in European history obviates such an explanation.
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While current antisemitism in Spain is also connected to the Middle East
conflict and to anti-Israel sentiments, its cultural and ideological composi-
tion is significantly different. We argue that the central explanatory variable
for antisemitism in Spain is still religion in a broad cultural sense, and in
435 particular the aspect of religion that Charles Glock (1962) has identified as
its ‘consequential’ dimension.15 Analysis of the group meetings has shown
that antisemitic hostility is expressed in three types of discourse: religious,
economic and political. While these are more or less defining for each
respective group, the religious element is exceptional, acting as a matrix for
440 all the others and encompassing Israel-related antisemitism.
Antisemitic discourse based on religious socialization has as its central
symbol the myth of deicide, which produces a number of values, attitudes
and behaviors. It is one of the key symbolic elements of the Catholic
religion. It characterizes the essence of Jews as a people by reference to the
445 killing of the son of God. If when you want to say someone is bad, you say
he/she is Jewish, this naming of ‘badness’ as Jewish presupposes the
permanent enactment of the founding myth of Christianity. The repetition
of this representation of Jews rests on the same processes of socialization
and education which buttress the ceremonial reproduction of the myth.
450 These religious images also contain a number of profane stereotypes which
are part of a wider social representation of Jews: the intelligence of Jews,
their concomitant craftiness and their diligence in work. The current
conflict between Palestinians and Israelis has come to represent the essence
of this religious culture. The conflict is constituted as a secular
455 reproduction of a sacred myth based on religious stereotypes: ‘because of
the way they are, because with the Jews it’s ‘an eye for an eye’, they manifest
ill-will, cruelty and vengeance in their basic social values and relations with
other peoples. It may appear that this type of discourse is retreating due to
strong forces of secularization and modernization. However, the obvious
460 weakening of the Catholic religion as a focus for organized practices has not
automatically led to a loss of its symbolic functions.16 The secularization of
antisemitic images does not erase their religious origin.
This deep-rooted Catholic substratum in Spanish culture explains why
we find the religious dimension of antisemitism underlying the other two
15. Glock defines this dimension in terms of the consequences of belief, religious praxis
and religious experience on the everyday life of individuals (Starck and Glock 1970:
16). Here we explore the traces of Catholicism in the habitus of individuals, a system
of dispositions ‘whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated
conditions of its production’ (Bourdieu 1990: 55).
16. See, for example, the condensed discourse of our group of Madrid progressives: ‘and
obviously, most of us are Catholics. As I’ve said, ‘we are’ because that’s our tradition. In
fact, I’m also an atheist’ (RG6).
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465 dimensions we have identified.17 Here it is necessary to point to the
exception of RG4, the group of young students from Barcelona, who
articulated far fewer antisemitic cliche´s and more reflective positions with
regard to the Palestine Israel conflict. It was also this group which showed a
high degree of remoteness and ignorance with regard to religion and the
470 Church. In this respect we may say that ‘exculturation’ (Hervieu-Le´ger
1993), the process by which culture loses its Catholic roots, has an influence
on the employment of antisemitic interpretations of reality (ideologemes).
The economically based antisemitic discourse is characterized by a
reduction of the Jew and Jewishness to economic power and its translation
475 into a capacity to influence and manipulate reality. This discourse of
economic power is also rooted in the Spanish cultural amalgam. Thus the
rhetorical stereotypes linked to usury and to Jews’ relation to commerce
are being updated through images such as ‘they control money’ or ‘they
control the large companies’. This economic dimension may seem at first
480 sight disentangled from sacred values, the foundational myth which ushers
in the accusation of malice, but it is linked to power in the profane world
and the influence money brings: ‘that’s what I say about the Jews, that the
biggest countries, you know, which have so much money through their
companies, they don’t say anything to them and they do what they want,
485 right?’ The discourse associating Jews with economic power continues to
depict them as a source of danger and malice. It is expressed across a broad
ideological spectrum, from conservative groups (as indicated) to more
progressive-minded professionals.
In the politics-based antisemitic discourse, the dominant lens through
490 which Jews and Judaism are perceived is that of the Palestine Israel
conflict. The experience of the conflict boils down to the consummate
production and intensification of feelings:18 ‘they have doors in the wall and
when it rains they close the sluice gates to drown them’ (collective homicides
using inhuman techniques); ‘they shoot at water tanks so there’s no water in
495 the houses’ (targeting the civilian population); ‘[Palestinians] have to have
grids in the streets so that the garbage they throw on them doesn’t fall on them’
17. We would agree with scholars who interpret antisemitism in terms of cultural theory
as a function of Christianity. William Brustein (2003) also distinguishes between
religious, economic and political dimensions of antisemitic discourse (adding a fourth
racial dimension). His answer to the persistence of antisemitism is the primacy of
Judaism as the core belief system through which and against which the central
cultural/religious motors of European identity are defined.
18. There is a growing emphasis on feelings over reason, and to the detriment of the
latter, emanating from Palestine Solidarity campaigns in Spain. See, for instance, a
recent video in support of a second flotilla to break the Gaza blockade with the title
‘Y tu´ que´ sientes’ (What do you feel?): http://www.youtube.com/watch?
vWH04W38WBDQ.
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(humiliating, inhuman and vexing treatment); Jews are seen as ‘A
permanent source of conflict everywhere’. The conflict reactivates images
and sentiments as powerful as older myths linked to religious rhetoric.
500 Hate, vengeance, impunity are the basic semantics through which the
position of Israel is assessed.
Consensus concerning the problematic nature of the state of Israel and
its lack of political and historical legitimacy unites all but one of the
groups. The trajectory of collective representations goes from the
505 definition of Israel as a problem to its absolute negation, passing through
an emphasis on its artificial nature and the ‘error’ of its creation. The
different social sectors emphasize different moments: from the conserva-
tive and more moderate-reflective sectors (Israel as problem), passing
through the more centrist sectors of society (‘error’, ‘artificial state’), to
510 the more activist youth groups on the left (comparison to Nazi Germany).
Finally, we need to mention the role of denial in antisemitism, expressed
in the condemnation of antisemitism while simultaneously entertaining an
antisemitic discourse. The negation of antisemitism and the normalization
of anti-Jewish hostility are at the same time basic components of the
515 Spanish case. It would appear that hostility to and negative opinions about
‘the Jews’ operate in a sort of unreflective declaratory mode. They exist on
a plane of normalcy. With nothing to snag their arguments, antisemitism is
invisible to antisemites. Perhaps we could say that the antisemite is
invisible to him- or herself. Antisemitic stereotypes somehow escape the
520 politically correct ethical and integrative norms of universalism which
guide the treatment of other minorities in contemporary Spain.AQ5
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